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THE FIVE STAGES OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION

An Organizational-Lifecycle Framework for Governance, Operations, and Policy

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The framework presented in this paper is also presented in abbreviated form as Section 1.3 of Knight, I. (2026), *Fundamentals of Association Management — A Textbook for Early-Career Managers* (Texas Active Enterprise, LLC). The two works are intentionally complementary; the present paper develops the theoretical foundations and policy implications, while the textbook focuses on practitioner application.

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Abstract

This paper proposes The Five Stages of American Community Association — a staged developmental model describing the governance, operational, and regulatory evolution of homeowner associations, planned communities, and condominiums in the United States. Drawing on five decades of organizational lifecycle research (Greiner, 1972; Quinn and Cameron, 1983; Adizes, 1988; Miller and Friesen, 1984), the political-economy literature on private residential government (McKenzie, 1994), the civic-engagement framework of Putnam (2000), and Ostrom's (1990) common-pool-resource governance principles, the model identifies five distinct stages through which community associations typically progress: Declarant, Transition, Stabilization, Adaptive Change, and Maturity & Reiteration. Each stage is characterized by predictable shifts in governance authority, volunteer engagement, demographic composition, capital condition, and regulatory exposure. The model is grounded in operative state statutory frameworks, including Texas Property Code Chapter 209 and the Texas Uniform Condominium Act (Chapter 82), the Davis-Stirling Common Interest Development Act (California), and Florida Statutes Chapter 718. The paper develops the theoretical foundations, presents stage-level diagnostic criteria, identifies recurring inflection points and their statutory triggers, and proposes a practitioner-facing diagnostic framework. Implications are drawn for industry standards, regulatory design, and reserve-funding policy. The framework is offered as a predictive and diagnostic tool for managers, board members, regulators, lenders, and researchers seeking to understand and navigate the long-term trajectory of American community associations.

Keywords: *community association governance; organizational lifecycle theory; homeowner associations; condominium law; reserve funding; Privatopia; common-interest community; Davis-Stirling; Texas Property Code; common-pool resources.*

JEL Classification: *L31 (Nonprofit Institutions); R31 (Housing Supply and Markets); D71 (Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations); K11 (Property Law).*

Foreword

The Common Interest Community Standards Council exists to convene practitioners, scholars, regulators, and other stakeholders around the systematic improvement of governance and operations in common-interest communities. The Council's working-paper series is the principal venue through which we publish original frameworks and policy analyses that warrant industry-wide consideration. Working papers in the series are not consensus documents; they are author-attributed analyses offered to advance discussion.

The present paper is the inaugural entry in the 2026 series. It articulates a developmental model — five stages through which community associations progress from declarant control through institutional maturity — that the author has been developing in practice since 2014. The Council publishes the paper because it offers a coherent, predictive, and practically useful framework for understanding why community associations face the particular challenges they face at the particular times they face them. The framework is grounded in canonical organizational lifecycle research and supported by the statutory infrastructure governing common-interest communities in the major states.

Readers are invited to test the framework against their own operational and policy experience. Comments, applications, and critiques may be directed to the author and to the editors of the working-paper series at the addresses noted in the colophon. Subsequent papers in the series will explore stage-specific operational and regulatory questions in greater depth.

— Editorial Board, CICSC Working Paper Series
May 2026

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PART I

Theoretical Foundation

1. Introduction

Common-interest housing is the dominant form of new residential development in the United States. The Foundation for Community Association Research estimates that more than 75 million Americans — approximately one in four households — reside in communities governed by mandatory homeowner associations, condominium regimes, or comparable common-interest arrangements.¹

Community associations function as private nonprofit governments. They impose binding rules on every owner within a defined geographic boundary, levy compulsory assessments, maintain shared physical infrastructure, and resolve internal disputes through quasi-administrative procedures. The political-economy literature has long recognized that these features place community associations in a distinct category: they are simultaneously private corporations under state nonprofit law, governmental entities under the political theory of Privatopia, and common-pool-resource institutions under Ostrom's framework.^{2,3,4}

Despite the scale and significance of this institutional form, the literature lacks a coherent developmental framework specific to community associations. Organizational lifecycle theory, well-developed for corporations and nonprofit organizations more broadly, has been applied to community associations only sporadically and never systematically. Practitioners — managers, board members, attorneys, accountants — operate with rich tacit knowledge of how associations evolve over time, but that knowledge is rarely codified and almost never linked to the underlying theoretical literature.

This paper addresses that gap. It proposes *The Five Stages of American Community Association* — a staged developmental model that synthesizes canonical organizational lifecycle research with the statutory and operational realities of community associations in the United States. The model is offered as a predictive, diagnostic, and policy-relevant framework: it predicts the kinds of governance pressures associations will face at each stage, diagnoses the stage of any specific association from observable indicators, and surfaces the points at which industry standards and regulatory design intersect most consequentially with developmental dynamics.

The paper is organized in three parts. Part I (Sections 1–3) develops the theoretical foundation, reviewing the relevant organizational lifecycle literature and identifying the distinct features of community associations that require adaptation of that literature. Part II (Sections 4–9) presents the methodology and the five stages in detail. Part III (Sections 10–15) discusses cross-stage patterns, statutory and regulatory context, practitioner application, implications for industry standards, limitations, and conclusions. References and appendices follow.

2. Literature Review: Organizational Lifecycle Theory

Organizational lifecycle theory has developed across more than five decades of research in organization studies, strategic management, and political economy. This section reviews the strands most directly relevant to the present framework: the generic stage models from organizational research, the political-economy treatment of private residential government, and the common-pool-resource literature on collective governance.

2.1 Generic Stage Models

The lifecycle approach in organizational research originated in the work of scholars who observed that organizations, like biological organisms, appear to progress through identifiable stages. Stinchcombe's (1965) seminal observation that new organizations exhibit a "liability of newness" — a higher probability of failure during early years — established the empirical basis for stage thinking.⁵

Greiner (1972, revised 1998) proposed a five-stage model — creativity, direction, delegation, coordination, collaboration — separated by predictable crises. The model's enduring contribution is its insistence that growth proceeds not as smooth evolution but as alternation between stable evolutionary periods and disruptive revolutionary transitions. Each evolutionary period generates the conditions for its own crisis; each crisis, if successfully resolved, produces the structural innovations that sustain the next evolutionary period.⁶

Quinn and Cameron (1983) synthesized nine prior lifecycle models into a four-stage sequence — entrepreneurial, collectivity, formalization-and-control, and elaboration-of-structure — and demonstrated empirically that organizations in the same stage face the same kinds of strategic and structural challenges regardless of industry.⁷

Adizes (1988) added a diagnostic vocabulary widely used in practitioner consulting: courtship, infancy, go-go, adolescence, prime, stability, aristocracy, recrimination, bureaucracy, and death. The Adizes framework's central argument is that flexibility and control trade off across the lifecycle: young organizations are flexible but uncontrolled; mature organizations are controlled but inflexible. The optimum, Adizes argues, is the "prime" stage at which both flexibility and control are simultaneously high.⁸

Miller and Friesen (1984) tested lifecycle predictions empirically in a longitudinal study of 36 firms across approximately 5,000 firm-years. They found that lifecycle stage predicted strategic, structural, and decision-making characteristics with statistically significant consistency, supporting the position that lifecycle thinking is descriptively and predictively useful rather than merely metaphorical.⁹

Kimberly and Miles (1980), in an edited volume that consolidated the early lifecycle literature, identified the major theoretical commitments implicit in the lifecycle approach: organizations are bounded entities with identifiable beginnings, transitions are not random but patterned, and stage membership has consequences for strategy and structure. These commitments remain controversial in some quarters of organizational research; the present paper adopts them while remaining aware of the alternatives.¹⁰

Penrose (1959), though not typically classified as a lifecycle theorist, supplied the foundational insight that an organization's growth is constrained by the resources it accumulates and the managerial capacity that can be developed to deploy those resources. This insight is central to community-association lifecycle dynamics, where managerial capacity (board volunteer engagement, professional management quality, reserve adequacy) is the binding constraint at multiple stages.¹¹

2.2 Privatopia and the Private-Government Tradition

McKenzie's (1994) *Privatopia* is the foundational scholarly treatment of community associations as private governments. McKenzie traces the rise of common-interest housing in the United States from postwar suburban planning through the explosion of homeowner-association developments in the 1970s and 1980s. The book's central argument is that community associations have become functional private governments — exercising regulatory, taxing, and adjudicatory authority within defined territorial boundaries — without the constitutional safeguards that constrain public governments. McKenzie's framework establishes that any analysis of community-association evolution must engage the political-economy dimensions of private government, not merely the corporate-organizational ones.²

Subsequent work in the *Privatopia* tradition has developed specific lines of inquiry: the political-participation dynamics of association membership, the constitutional and statutory limits on association rule-making authority, the comparative analysis of common-interest governance against municipal incorporation, and the public-policy questions raised by the substitution of association infrastructure for public infrastructure in new development. While this paper does not engage these questions exhaustively, it adopts the foundational *Privatopia* premise: community associations are governments-by-other-means, and their developmental trajectories must be understood in those terms.^{12,13}

2.3 Common-Pool-Resource Governance

Ostrom's (1990) *Governing the Commons* established that durable institutions for the management of common-pool resources exhibit identifiable design principles: clearly defined boundaries, congruence between rules and local conditions, collective-choice arrangements, monitoring, graduated sanctions, conflict-resolution mechanisms, and recognition of the institution's right to organize. Ostrom's work, which earned the 2009 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences, supplies a framework specifically suited to long-lived common-property institutions — exactly what mature community associations are.⁴

The application of Ostrom's design principles to community associations has been undertaken sporadically but never systematically. The present paper argues that the Maturity & Reiteration stage of community-association development is the stage at which Ostrom's principles become most diagnostically useful, because it is the stage at which the institution either successfully maintains the design conditions that sustain long-term commons governance or begins to lose them.

2.4 Civic Engagement and Social Capital

Putnam's (2000) *Bowling Alone* argues that American civic engagement and the social capital it produces have declined materially across the second half of the twentieth century, with consequences for the functioning of voluntary institutions of every kind. For community associations, Putnam's framework is particularly important because participation is structurally voluntary even where membership is mandatory: owners are required to belong, but they are not required to attend meetings, serve on the board, vote in elections, or otherwise engage. The trajectory of any specific association's participation rate is a leading indicator of its institutional health.¹⁴

2.5 Synthesis

Five strands inform the framework developed in this paper. The generic lifecycle models (Greiner, Quinn and Cameron, Adizes, Miller and Friesen, Kimberly and Miles) supply the staged structure. *Privatopia* (McKenzie and successors) supplies the political-economy lens that distinguishes community associations from generic nonprofits. Common-pool-resource governance (Ostrom) supplies the framework for evaluating long-term institutional durability. The civic-engagement literature (Putnam) supplies the participation lens that tracks volunteer-driven governance over time. The resource-based view (Penrose) supplies the constraint-recognition framework for understanding why associations face the specific operational pressures they face at specific stages.

None of these strands, individually, produces a complete framework for community-association lifecycle analysis. Their synthesis, applied to the specific institutional features of community associations and grounded in the operative state statutory regimes, is the framework this paper develops.

3. The Distinct Case of Community Associations

Community associations differ from generic nonprofits, generic for-profit corporations, and generic municipal governments in ways that require adaptation of standard lifecycle frameworks. Three distinguishing features are most consequential for the present analysis.

3.1 Mandatory Membership Tied to Real Property

The covenants creating a community association run with the land. Every successive owner of property within the association's defined boundaries becomes a member by operation of law upon acquiring title; no successive owner can opt out, transfer the membership separate from the property, or otherwise terminate the relationship while retaining the underlying real estate.^{15,16}

This distinguishes community associations from voluntary associations of every other kind. The voluntary associations Putnam (2000) studies — bowling leagues, fraternal organizations, civic clubs — face existential pressure when membership engagement declines, because members can leave. Community associations cannot dissolve through member departure; the assets are real property tied to the legal entity, and the entity persists regardless of how engaged the membership is. This permanence is a structural feature with significant lifecycle implications: associations cannot "fail" in the way ordinary voluntary associations fail, and cannot simply re-form when conditions change. They evolve, or they degenerate.

3.2 Statutorily-Constrained Self-Governance

Unlike most nonprofits, community associations operate under detailed state statutory regimes that constrain rule-making authority, prescribe procedural requirements for governance acts, mandate insurance and reserve practices in some jurisdictions, and create cause-of-action regimes for member challenges to board action. The Texas Property Code Chapter 209 (for property-owners associations), Chapter 82 (the Texas Uniform Condominium Act), the Davis-Stirling Common Interest Development Act in California, and Florida Statutes Chapter 718 (condominiums) and Chapter 720 (homeowner associations) are the most fully-developed examples of this regulatory architecture.^{17,18,19,20,21}

Statutory constraints interact with lifecycle stage in patterned ways. Some constraints (mandatory disclosure during the declarant period; mandatory transition deadlines) target specific stages directly. Other constraints (open-meeting rules, records-retention obligations, due-process requirements for enforcement actions) apply throughout the lifecycle but become most consequential during specific stages. Section 11 of this paper develops the statutory-stage interactions in detail.

3.3 Asymmetric Capital Burden

Community associations carry physical-infrastructure obligations that scale with the age of the underlying built environment but typically do not scale with the membership's willingness to fund them. The reserve study — required by industry standards under the National Reserve Study Standards (Foundation for Community Association Research) and by statute in several states — exists because the predictable replacement of long-lived components (roofs, pavement, building systems, amenities) creates capital obligations that increase over time even as institutional memory and participation can decline.^{22,23}

This asymmetry — capital obligations scaling with age, while institutional capacity does not necessarily scale — is the central economic dynamic of community-association lifecycle. It produces the characteristic late-stage pressures (Stage 4 onwards) that no analogue in generic corporate or nonprofit lifecycle theory fully captures.

Implication for the framework

Generic lifecycle models predict that organizations either resolve their crises and progress, or fail to resolve them and decline or die. Community associations cannot die through member departure; they persist regardless. The lifecycle framework for community associations must therefore predict not only progression but degenerative trajectories within continued institutional existence — and the framework's diagnostic value lies in identifying these trajectories early enough that intervention is possible.

PART II

The Five-Stage Model

4. Methodology

The framework presented in this paper is constructed through analytical synthesis rather than original empirical investigation. The author has integrated three streams of input: (a) the canonical organizational-lifecycle theoretical literature reviewed in Section 2; (b) the operative state statutory regimes governing community associations in the principal jurisdictions, with Texas, California, and Florida treated as illustrative; (c) the author's practitioner experience in community-association management between 2014 and 2025, including direct engagement with associations across all five proposed stages.

The framework is therefore best understood as a hypothesis-generating synthesis rather than a hypothesis-tested empirical model. Section 14 of this paper identifies the empirical tests that would advance the framework from synthesis to validated theory; the present paper does not undertake those tests but designs them in a manner that allows them to be undertaken by interested researchers.

4.1 Stage Definition and Boundary Criteria

Each of the five stages is defined by a set of necessary and sufficient conditions: necessary in that an association lacking the conditions is not in the stage; sufficient in that an association meeting the conditions is in the stage. The conditions are stated in operational terms (governance authority, demographic composition, capital condition, regulatory exposure) so that any specific association can be classified by an external observer without privileged information.

Stage boundaries are not absolute. The framework identifies typical year ranges for each stage, but actual stage transitions are triggered by association-specific events (developer turnover, generational demographic shifts, major capital decisions, regulatory amendments) rather than by the passage of time alone. An association may remain in a stage longer than the typical year range if the triggering events are delayed; conversely, an association may compress through a stage faster than the typical range if the triggering events occur quickly.

4.2 The Five Stages

The five stages developed in Sections 5–9 are: Declarant (typical years 0–10), Transition (typical years 10–15), Stabilization (typical years 15–30), Adaptive Change (typical years 30–45), and Maturity & Reiteration (typical years 45 and beyond). Each stage section follows the same structure: defining characteristics, governance dynamics, statutory anchor, key practitioner indicators, and characteristic failure modes.

4.3 Sources and Citation Practice

Citations follow a numbered-reference convention. Statutory citations are to the version in effect at the time of writing (May 2026); readers applying the framework after publication should verify currency. Practitioner-experience claims are unmarked but are characteristic of the author's direct engagement

with multiple associations across the relevant stages; the author makes no claim that the patterns described are universal or invariant.

5. Stage 1 — Declarant (Years 0–10)

The Declarant stage encompasses the period from the recording of the Declaration through the statutorily- or contractually-mandated transition of control to a homeowner-elected board. The defining feature of this stage is the developer's controlling interest — the developer (the "declarant") drafts the governing documents, populates the initial board, selects vendors, sets the initial assessment level, and makes nearly every consequential decision.

5.1 Defining Characteristics

During the Declarant stage, three structural features dominate. First, the developer holds majority or unanimous control of the board, either directly through developer-appointed director seats or indirectly through reserved decision rights. Second, the governing documents reflect the developer's commercial interests — facilitating sales, minimizing carrying costs during sell-out, and preserving developer flexibility — rather than the long-term interests of the eventual homeowner membership. Third, the homeowner membership itself is incomplete: only the units that have been sold and closed have voting members, and those members are typically a numerical minority during most of the stage.^{17,18}

5.2 Governance Dynamics

The governance dynamics of the Declarant stage parallel what Greiner (1972) characterized as the "creativity" stage of organizational development: centralized founder authority, informal procedure, and limited specialization. Adizes' (1988) corresponding stage — "infancy" or "go-go" — captures the same dynamic from a different angle: the organization runs on the founder's energy and judgment, without the formalized systems that come later.^{6,8}

Greiner predicted that every founding stage ends in a "crisis of leadership" — the founder's hands-on style stops working as the organization grows beyond the founder's personal span of control. In the community-association context, the equivalent crisis is the developer's reluctance to relinquish control even after the conditions triggering transition have been met. This reluctance is rational from the developer's perspective (continued control facilitates remaining sales and preserves vendor relationships favorable to the developer's adjacent interests) but problematic from the membership's perspective (the longer the developer retains control, the more the association's structural conditions reflect developer rather than member preferences).

5.3 Statutory Anchor

Texas Property Code § 82.103 and § 82.113 prescribe mandatory disclosures and the minimum board structure during the Declarant stage for condominiums under the Texas Uniform Condominium Act. § 82.103 requires the developer to provide each first-purchaser with a public-offering statement summarizing the budget, governing documents, warranties, and pending litigation. § 82.113 establishes the basic board structure that must be in place during developer control. Analogous provisions exist in Florida (Fla. Stat. § 718.301) and California (Cal. Civ. Code § 4250 and § 4260). The statutory architecture during the Declarant stage is principally designed to ensure adequate disclosure to first-purchasers and to prevent the most extreme forms of developer self-dealing.^{17,18,19,20}

5.4 Key Practitioner Indicators

- Developer holds majority or all board seats, either directly or through appointment authority retained in the Declaration.
- Assessment levels appear materially lower than the operating costs of comparable mature associations, often because reserve contributions are minimal or zero.
- Vendor relationships (landscape, pool, security, management) are with developer-affiliated entities or with vendors selected by the developer rather than by an independent procurement process.
- Initial residents (the "pioneers," in practitioner usage) report limited mechanisms for substantive input on governance decisions.
- Statutory disclosures to first-purchasers are present but procedurally minimal — the disclosure happens, but member education does not.

5.5 Characteristic Failure Modes

The most consequential Declarant-stage failure modes do not surface during the stage itself; they surface during and after Transition (Stage 2), when their cumulative effects become visible. They include: governing-document amendments recorded by the developer without the membership ratification that statute or the Declaration itself required; vendor contracts entered into on developer-favorable terms with auto-renewal mechanisms that bind the homeowner-controlled board for years after transition; reserve underfunding during the developer-controlled period that produces capital pressure visible only when major components reach the early end of their useful life; and incomplete common-area infrastructure accepted at transition because the punch list looked manageable but was, in fact, structurally significant.

Sanzaro v. Ardiente Homeowners Association (D. Nev., 9th Cir. aff'd 2018) is one published case in which Declarant-stage governance decisions produced post-transition litigation that lasted years and consumed substantial association resources.²⁴

6. Stage 2 — Transition (Years 10–15, sometimes sooner)

The Transition stage is the period during which control of the association passes from the developer to a homeowner-elected board. It is, structurally, a single statutorily-defined event (the transition meeting) embedded in a process that may span eighteen to thirty-six months on either side of the meeting itself. The defining feature of this stage is the transfer of authority and the recalibration of the association's operating conditions that follows.

6.1 Defining Characteristics

Three features distinguish the Transition stage. First, statutory transition deadlines, set in Texas Property Code § 209.00593 and § 82.106, in the Davis-Stirling Act, and in Florida Statutes § 718.301, become operative. These statutes prescribe both the conditions under which transition must occur (typically a percentage of units sold combined with a maximum period of years from declaration) and the records and assets that must be turned over.^{17,18,19,20}

Second, homeowner board members — typically the original "pioneers" — assume responsibility for an institution whose conditions were not of their making. They inherit the governing documents the developer drafted, the vendor contracts the developer signed, the reserve fund the developer funded (or did not), and the physical infrastructure the developer constructed. Their initial governance challenge is less to lead the institution than to inventory and triage what they have inherited.

Third, the institutional culture of the association is, at this stage, in the process of being formed. Putnam's (2000) civic-engagement framework is at its most diagnostic during Transition: the patterns of meeting attendance, committee participation, electoral turnout, and informal member-to-member communication established during the first homeowner-controlled years tend to persist for decades.¹⁴

6.2 Governance Dynamics

The Transition stage corresponds to what Greiner (1972) called the "crisis of leadership" and its resolution: the founder's centralized control gives way to a more distributed governance structure, but only if the transition is managed effectively. In community associations, the resolution is statutorily mandated rather than discretionary, but the quality of the resolution varies widely.

Cheung and Leung (2006), studying member-controlled transitions in nonprofit organizations more generally, found that the success of post-founder transitions depended primarily on three factors: the quality of records turned over, the institutional capacity built among incoming volunteer leadership during the transition period, and the existence of professional intermediaries (counsel, accountants, engineers) capable of independently auditing the inherited conditions.²⁵

This finding maps directly to community-association practice. A homeowner board that engages independent counsel for governing-document review, an independent CPA for financial audit, an independent engineer for common-area inspection, and an independent reserve-study firm during the transition period is materially more likely to produce a successful post-transition association than a homeowner board that accepts the developer's representations and inherited vendors without independent verification.

6.3 Statutory Anchor

Several states have explicit transition-deadline statutes. Texas Property Code § 209.00593 prescribes transition obligations for property-owners associations; § 82.106 of the Texas Uniform Condominium Act prescribes the parallel obligation for condominiums. Florida Statutes § 718.301 prescribes the Florida condominium-transition regime in detail. California's Davis-Stirling Common Interest Development Act prescribes parallel provisions through the Civil Code §§ 4900 et seq. and §§ 4920 et seq. Practitioners should consult counsel licensed in the relevant state for the specific obligations in any particular case.^{17,18,19,20}

Where a developer fails to comply with a statutory transition deadline, homeowners typically have a private cause of action to compel transition. The Lewis Thomason Law Firm has documented several cases in which courts ordered developers to relinquish control in response to such actions.²⁶

6.4 Key Practitioner Indicators

- Statutory transition deadline either approaching, met, or — in problematic cases — passed without action.
- First homeowner-controlled board has been seated, or is in the process of being seated.
- Records turnover is being accomplished — completely, partially, or in dispute.
- Independent professional engagements (counsel, CPA, engineer, reserve-study firm) are being commissioned, or — where they are not — that absence is itself a leading indicator of post-transition difficulty.
- First substantive vote of the homeowner board on a non-routine matter (a vendor contract renegotiation, a reserve-funding policy adoption, a governing-document amendment) typically occurs within twelve months of seating.

6.5 Characteristic Failure Modes

Transition-stage failure modes are, in effect, the consequences of the Declarant-stage decisions that are now becoming visible plus new errors introduced during the transition itself. The most consequential transition failures observed in practitioner experience include: acceptance of common-area infrastructure that is incomplete or substandard, foreclosing later warranty recourse; missed developer-warranty

windows on completed work, transferring construction-defect liability from developer to association; inheritance of vendor contracts with auto-renewal terms or favorable-to-vendor change-order provisions; and acceptance of governing-document amendments whose chain-of-authorization is suspect.

The cumulative cost of these failures is rarely visible at transition; it surfaces five to fifteen years later, often in the form of major-component replacement costs that exceed reserve-fund balances by orders of magnitude.

Methodological note — The Transition Trap

The framework's most consequential single empirical claim is that the quality of the Transition is the most important predictor of long-term association financial performance. This claim is testable: an empirical study comparing reserve-funding adequacy at year 30 between associations that engaged independent professional review during transition and those that did not would constitute a significant test of the framework. The author invites such research; in the absence of such research, the claim is supported by practitioner experience and by the general findings of Cheung and Leung (2006) on nonprofit transitions.

7. Stage 3 — Stabilization (Years 15–30)

The Stabilization stage is the period during which routine takes over. The defining feature of this stage is the establishment of recognizable patterns: annual budget cycles, regularized board meetings, predictable vendor relationships, and member-engagement practices that persist substantially unchanged across multiple board cohorts.

7.1 Defining Characteristics

Quinn and Cameron (1983) characterize the equivalent generic-organization stage as "formalization and control," in which the organization codifies its practices and shifts decision-making weight from individual founders or transition leaders to procedure. In community associations, the codification typically takes the form of written board policies, established committee charters, recurring vendor contracts, and stabilized assessment levels.⁷

Demographically, the original "pioneers" of the homeowner-controlled period begin to sell or move during Stabilization, and a new generation of owners — typically with no direct experience of the Declarant-controlled period — assumes the membership. By the end of Stabilization, the institutional memory of the Declarant period is typically resident only in long-tenured board members, in the records (where preserved), and in the management company (where continuous).

7.2 Governance Dynamics

Adizes (1988) characterizes the equivalent generic stage as "prime" — the simultaneously high-flexibility, high-control state that he treats as the optimum of organizational existence.⁸

In community associations, the equivalent claim is more nuanced. Stabilization can be a high-functioning state if the institutional capacity built during transition is maintained: financial controls operate, reserves accumulate at the rate the study requires, governing-document compliance is consistent, member engagement remains adequate to staff committees and elect competent boards. But Stabilization is not self-maintaining. The risk is institutional drift — the slow accretion of small departures from established practice that, over a decade, produces a materially weaker institution than the one that entered the stage.

The *Andrew Taylor v. Deer Path Homeowners Association* (Indiana Court of Appeals) case is illustrative. The court found that a Stabilization-stage association had drifted from required annual-meeting and election practices over a multi-year period; the cumulative non-compliance produced litigation that, while resolved, consumed institutional resources and surfaced governance weaknesses that had been building incrementally.²⁷

7.3 Statutory Anchor

Stabilization-stage statutory architecture concentrates on routinization and accountability. Texas Property Code § 209.0051 (open meetings for property-owners associations) and § 82.105 (open meetings for condominiums) prescribe the open-meeting standards that govern routine board operation. Records-retention obligations under §§ 209.005 and 82.114 prescribe the corporate-records discipline that is the institutional substrate of Stabilization.^{17,18}

Davis-Stirling (Cal. Civ. Code §§ 4920-4955) prescribes analogous open-meeting and records-retention obligations in California, and Florida Statutes § 718.112(2)(c) prescribes the parallel obligations for Florida condominiums. The unifying theme of Stabilization-stage statutory architecture is procedural rather than substantive: the statutes do not constrain what the board may decide so much as how the board must decide.^{19,20}

7.4 Key Practitioner Indicators

- Annual-meeting attendance and electoral participation rates have stabilized at a level characteristic of the association — typically lower than during the immediate post-transition years.
- Board composition has turned over at least once since transition; the current board includes members with no personal experience of the Declarant-controlled period.
- Vendor relationships are mature; routine maintenance is performed without board-level escalation.

- Reserve fund balance is consistent with the funding strategy adopted during or after transition; reserve study is current (within five years).
- Aged accounts receivable has stabilized within the 3-5% diagnostic band defined by industry practitioner convention.²⁸

7.5 Characteristic Failure Modes

The dominant Stabilization-stage failure mode is drift — the cumulative effect of small departures from established practice, none of which is individually serious, that produce a materially weaker institution at the end of the stage than at the beginning. Drift manifests as: rules-binder accretion (each new board adds prohibitions in response to specific incidents, but no board periodically prunes accumulated rules); reserve-funding decisions that hold the assessment flat in good years by reducing the reserve contribution below the study recommendation; bank-reconciliation review that becomes pro forma rather than substantive; vendor-contract renewals that proceed without re-bid for years or decades.

Each of these patterns is individually defensible at the moment of decision. Their cumulative effect, observed at year 30, is a Stabilization-stage association that is substantially less institutionally capable than its year-15 baseline. The framework's diagnostic value at this stage is its emphasis on cross-time comparison rather than cross-section assessment alone.

8. Stage 4 — Adaptive Change (Years 30–45)

The Adaptive Change stage is the period during which the asymmetric capital burden identified in Section 3.3 becomes operationally consequential. Long-lived components of the built environment — roofs, pavement, building systems, amenities — reach the end of their useful lives and must be replaced. The reserve-funding decisions made during the preceding stages now produce visible consequences.

8.1 Defining Characteristics

Adaptive Change is the stage at which the trade-off between flexibility and control identified by Adizes (1988) becomes binding in a specific way: the association's accumulated procedural infrastructure, well-suited to routine operation during Stabilization, may not be well-suited to the larger and more politically consequential capital decisions that Adaptive Change requires. Greiner's (1972) parallel "crisis of red tape" — the formalization that worked in the prior stage becomes the constraint that prevents adaptive response — is observed empirically.^{6,8}

Demographically, the generation of homeowners who took title at or near transition has aged in place. The current membership includes substantial proportions of long-tenured residents whose initial assessment expectations were set by the late Declarant or early Transition period and a more recent

cohort of newer owners with materially different expectations regarding association amenities and assessment levels.

8.2 Governance Dynamics

The governance dynamics of Adaptive Change are characterized by elevated political stakes around capital decisions. A roof replacement, an asphalt overlay, an elevator modernization, an amenity-center renovation — each of these decisions is, in dollar terms, materially larger than any single Stabilization-stage decision, and each carries political consequences for the directors who vote for it.

The reserve-funding decisions made during Stabilization now meet their consequences. An association that funded reserves at the level the study required arrives at Adaptive Change with the resources to execute the planned replacements without disrupting current operations or imposing special assessments. An association that underfunded reserves arrives at Adaptive Change with a structural gap that must be closed through some combination of special assessment, bank financing, or service reduction. The political cost of the latter falls disproportionately on the current board, even though the underfunding decisions were made by predecessors.

Inwood North Homeowners' Association v. Harris (Texas Supreme Court, 1987) established the legal authority of community associations to enforce assessments and foreclose for non-payment, an authority that becomes operationally relevant at Adaptive Change as special assessments and assessment increases become more common.²⁹

8.3 Statutory Anchor

Adaptive Change statutory architecture is, increasingly, focused on capital-decision discipline. Several states have moved toward mandatory reserve-study and reserve-funding standards: California's Davis-Stirling Act, Florida's post-Surfside reserve mandates following the 2021 Champlain Towers collapse, and parallel provisions in other jurisdictions. The trajectory of state regulation in this area is toward greater rather than lesser prescriptiveness, principally because under-reserved Adaptive Change failures produce externalities that affect lender willingness to finance units in the affected community.^{19,20,30}

8.4 Key Practitioner Indicators

- Reserve study identifies one or more major components within five years of replacement.
- Reserve-fund balance compared to the fully-funded balance from the most recent study indicates underfunding requiring multi-year correction.
- Long-tenured directors begin to retire; volunteer-recruitment effort intensifies.
- Insurance market terms (premium increases, deductible structures, carrier availability) become a regular agenda item.

- Special-assessment proposals become an active topic, even if not always adopted.

8.5 Characteristic Failure Modes

The dominant Adaptive Change failure mode is deferred adaptation. Boards facing the political cost of necessary capital decisions choose to defer them, typically by deferring maintenance, deferring reserve replenishment, or deferring necessary assessment increases. Each deferral is locally rational; the cumulative effect is to compound the eventual cost while transferring the political consequences to a successor board.

In severe cases, deferred adaptation produces what may be characterized as "Adaptive Change failure" — the association exits the stage with a materially weaker institutional and physical condition than it entered, and arrives at Stage 5 (Maturity & Reiteration) with a governance burden that may exceed the institutional capacity available to bear it.

9. Stage 5 — Maturity and Reiteration (Years 45 and Beyond)

The Maturity and Reiteration stage is the period at which an association has become an institution. Two distinct trajectories are observed within the stage. Some associations sustain steady-state equilibrium, maintaining institutional capacity, member engagement, and physical condition at levels established during prior stages. Others undergo reinvention — major redevelopment, a merger with a neighboring association, a wholesale rewrite of governing documents, or a building-condominium-conversion — that effectively restarts the lifecycle in part or in whole.

9.1 Defining Characteristics

Quinn and Cameron's (1983) corresponding generic stage is "elaboration of structure" or "renewal," with the explicit recognition that mature organizations either refresh their structure or begin to decline. Adizes' (1988) corresponding stage is "aristocracy," with its associated tendency toward complacency and resistance to change.^{7,8}

Ostrom's (1990) common-pool-resource design principles become most diagnostic at this stage. The associations that successfully sustain institutional health into Stage 5 generally exhibit Ostrom's design conditions: clearly defined boundaries (preserved through governing-document discipline), collective-choice arrangements (preserved through participatory governance), monitoring (preserved through inspection cycles and financial review), graduated sanctions (preserved through enforcement consistency), and conflict-resolution mechanisms (preserved through ADR adoption). Associations that have lost one or more of these conditions tend to exhibit corresponding deterioration in institutional capacity.⁴

9.2 Governance Dynamics

Stage 5 governance dynamics are bifurcated. Associations on the steady-state trajectory operate substantially as they did during late Stabilization, with the additional weight of accumulated governing-document amendments, established traditions, and physical-asset condition reflective of the maintenance investment of the preceding decades. Associations on the reinvention trajectory undertake structural change of a kind not typically observed in the prior stages: governing-document rewrites, major capital redevelopment, corporate restructuring, or — in some cases — the conversion of the association from one form of common-interest community to another.

The reinvention pathway is, in effect, an intentional reset of the lifecycle. The association that successfully completes a major reinvention re-enters the lifecycle at an earlier stage, typically late Transition or early Stabilization, with the institutional advantage of accumulated experience but the institutional challenge of a substantially-changed operational environment.

9.3 Statutory Anchor

Stage 5 statutory architecture is, at present, less developed than the architecture for the earlier stages. Texas Property Code § 209.004 prescribes the basic election and recordkeeping obligations applicable to mature associations; § 82.111 of the Texas Uniform Condominium Act prescribes the parallel obligations for mature condominiums. These statutes do not impose stage-specific obligations; they prescribe the general operational standards that apply throughout the lifecycle.^{17,18}

The principal area in which Stage 5-relevant statutory regulation is developing is termination, dissolution, and reinvention. Several states have adopted procedures for the dissolution of common-interest communities (with concomitant transfer of common-area assets and assessment authority) and for the consolidation or amendment of declarations governing aged communities. Practitioners advising Stage 5 associations on reinvention should consult the relevant statutory framework in the operative jurisdiction.

9.4 Key Practitioner Indicators

- Association is at or beyond the typical Maturity threshold (year 45 from declaration), with evidence of ongoing institutional capacity or accumulating signs of institutional drift.
- Governing documents have either been amended through formal restatement or have accumulated substantial layered amendments that complicate interpretation.
- Capital infrastructure has been replaced at least once since original construction, with the second replacement cycle now visible in the reserve study.
- Member-engagement metrics either match Stabilization-stage levels (steady-state trajectory) or have declined materially (drift trajectory).

- Reinvention discussions — major redevelopment, governing-document restatement, merger, or conversion — appear on the board's strategic agenda either episodically or continuously.

9.5 Characteristic Failure Modes

The dominant Stage 5 failure mode is institutional decline absent reinvention. Associations that fail to maintain Ostrom's design conditions and that do not undertake reinvention tend to exhibit gradual deterioration: declining participation, accumulating governance-document inconsistency, deferred maintenance compounding into structural failure, financial controls weakening, and — in extreme cases — receivership, court-appointed management, or municipal-level intervention.

The framework predicts that the trajectory of any specific Stage 5 association is determined principally by the institutional capacity carried forward from prior stages and by the strategic choices made during early Stage 5 regarding reinvention. Associations that arrived at Stage 5 with strong institutional capacity tend to maintain it absent specific shocks; associations that arrived with weak institutional capacity tend to deteriorate further absent intervention.

PART III

Discussion and Application

10. Cross-Stage Patterns and Inflection Points

Three patterns recur across the five stages and warrant separate discussion. Each is observed in at least three of the five stages and produces consequences that the stage-by-stage framework treats only partially.

10.1 The Path-Dependence of Reserve Funding

Reserve-funding adequacy is determined principally by decisions made during the Declarant and Transition stages and adjusted incrementally during Stabilization and Adaptive Change. The framework predicts — consistent with practitioner observation — that an association arriving at Stage 4 with a fully-funded reserve will have made consistent funding decisions across all prior stages, while an association arriving at Stage 4 underfunded will have made compensatory decisions during one or more prior stages that produced the gap. Reserve trajectories, in other words, are path-dependent: the cumulative consequence of dozens of small annual decisions is large and is rarely correctable through any single late-stage intervention.²²

10.2 The Volunteer-Engagement Constraint

Putnam's (2000) civic-engagement framework predicts — and practitioner experience confirms — that volunteer engagement is the binding constraint on community-association governance at multiple stages. The pool of owners willing to serve on the board, on committees, or in informal capacities is finite at any given moment; the demands on that pool grow as the association ages, the governing documents accumulate, and the capital condition becomes more complex.¹⁴

The framework predicts that associations entering Stage 4 (Adaptive Change) without having built engagement-development practices during Stabilization will face acute volunteer-recruitment difficulty during Stage 4 and Stage 5. Practitioner-facing implication: the time to invest in volunteer-engagement infrastructure is during Stabilization, when the demand on the volunteer pool is lowest, not during Adaptive Change, when it is highest.

10.3 The Statutory-Currency Question

State statutory regimes governing community associations are not static. Amendments are routine, and the body of regulation grows over time. An association that complies with its operative statute in year 15 may, by year 35, be operating under a substantially evolved statutory regime. The framework predicts — consistent with the trajectory of California's Davis-Stirling amendments, Florida's post-Surfside legislative response, and the periodic revisions to Texas Property Code Chapters 209 and 82 — that statutory currency is itself a stage-relevant question, with associations in later stages bearing more accumulated regulatory exposure.^{17,18,19,20}

11. Statutory and Regulatory Context

This section consolidates the statutory references introduced through the stage discussions and identifies the principal regulatory architecture applicable to community associations in the United States. The discussion is illustrative rather than comprehensive; practitioners should consult counsel licensed in the operative jurisdiction for specific applications.

11.1 Federal Architecture

Federal regulation of community associations is, by design, narrow. Three regimes have material effect: the Fair Housing Act (42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq.) prohibits discriminatory enforcement and requires reasonable accommodations and modifications for disabilities; the Housing for Older Persons Act (42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)(2)) permits age-restricted communities to exclude households without anyone 55 or older subject to specific compliance requirements; Internal Revenue Code § 528 and its implementing regulations govern the federal tax treatment of qualifying homeowner associations through Form 1120-H. The Federal Communications Commission's Over-the-Air Reception Devices rule (47 C.F.R. § 1.4000) limits association restrictions on certain antenna installations.^{31,32,33}

Federal statutory and regulatory currents are stable enough that they do not, at present, drive significant stage-specific dynamics. The most significant federal-level question affecting later-stage associations is the interaction with secondary-mortgage-market eligibility — Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac project requirements, FHA condo-project approval rules — which constrain insurance and reserve practices indirectly through the financing-eligibility requirement.^{34,35}

11.2 State Architecture

State statutory regimes, in contrast, drive material stage-specific dynamics. The principal state regimes operative as of May 2026 include Texas Property Code Chapter 209 (Texas Residential Property Owners Protection Act) and Chapter 82 (Texas Uniform Condominium Act); the Davis-Stirling Common Interest Development Act (California Civil Code §§ 4000-6150); Florida Statutes Chapter 718 (Condominium Act) and Chapter 720 (Homeowners' Association Act); and the Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act (UCIOA) as adopted in some states.^{17,18,19,20,36}

Each of these regimes prescribes obligations that map predictably to specific stages: disclosure and transition obligations during the Declarant and Transition stages; open-meeting, records, and assessment-collection obligations during Stabilization; reserve-study and capital-decision obligations during Adaptive Change. The framework treats these statutory architectures as inputs that constrain the practitioner-facing implications of the lifecycle model rather than as primary subject matter.

11.3 Industry-Standard Architecture

Beyond statute, two industry-standard architectures shape stage-specific practice. The Community Associations Institute's Best Practices Reports — including Best Practices Report 1 (Governance), Best Practices Report 5 (Strategic Planning), and Best Practices Report 7 (Reserve Studies) — prescribe practitioner conventions whose adoption is voluntary but widespread.^{28,37,38}

The Foundation for Community Association Research's National Reserve Study Standards establish the methodological framework for the reserve studies that drive financial-management decisions at Stages 3 through 5.²²

Where statutory and industry-standard frameworks diverge, statutory frameworks control; where they converge, the convergence typically reflects the absorption of industry-standard practice into statutory law over time. The trajectory of community-association regulation, in other words, has been one of progressive codification of practitioner conventions.

12. Practitioner Application Framework

This section translates the theoretical framework into a practitioner-facing diagnostic tool. The goal is to enable a manager, board member, attorney, or auditor to assess the current stage of any specific association from observable indicators and to identify the stage-specific governance priorities that follow.

12.1 Stage Identification Worksheet

Appendix A presents a structured Stage Identification Worksheet adapted for practitioner use. The worksheet operationalizes the defining characteristics of each stage as observable yes-or-no indicators and produces a stage assignment based on the pattern of responses. The worksheet is not intended as a research instrument; it is intended as a practitioner aid.

12.2 Stage-Specific Governance Priorities

Each stage of the framework implies a specific set of governance priorities. Stage 1 (Declarant) priorities are observational and preparatory: pioneers should familiarize themselves with the governing documents, monitor developer-controlled decisions, and prepare for the obligations of post-transition governance. Stage 2 (Transition) priorities are auditing and inheritance management: the homeowner board must rigorously audit the institution it has inherited and renegotiate vendor relationships where appropriate. Stage 3 (Stabilization) priorities are codification and drift-prevention: written policies, structured budget cycles, periodic governing-document review, and explicit reserve-funding policies. Stage 4 (Adaptive Change) priorities are capital-decision discipline and volunteer-engagement renewal: the reserve-funding adequacy of preceding stages becomes operationally consequential, and the volunteer pool that will execute the capital decisions must be cultivated. Stage 5 (Maturity & Reiteration) priorities are

institutional-capacity preservation and strategic reinvention assessment: Ostrom's design principles should be audited periodically, and reinvention pathways should be considered explicitly when steady-state operation is no longer producing institutional health.

12.3 Inflection-Point Recognition

Practitioners advising community associations should recognize the framework's identified inflection points and respond appropriately when they are observed. Three inflection points have particular operational significance:

1. The Transition Inflection (Stage 1 → Stage 2): triggered by the statutory or contractual transition deadline. Practitioners advising the homeowner board at this inflection should engage independent professional review of governing documents, financials, infrastructure, and reserve adequacy.
2. The Drift Inflection (Stage 3 mid-period): not triggered by any specific event but identifiable through cross-time comparison of institutional indicators. Practitioners observing increased aged-AR, reduced reserve-funding ratio, or accumulating governance-document inconsistency over multi-year periods should escalate the observation to the board.
3. The Capital Inflection (Stage 3 → Stage 4): triggered by the appearance of major-component replacement obligations within the five-year reserve-study window. Practitioners advising boards at this inflection should produce capital-financing analyses that include all available pathways (full funding, baseline funding, threshold funding, special assessment, bank financing) and present the trade-offs explicitly.

12.4 Communication With the Membership

The framework's value to practitioners is not exclusively diagnostic; it is also communicative. Boards facing politically consequential decisions during Stages 4 and 5 benefit from being able to articulate the lifecycle context within which those decisions sit. A special-assessment proposal accompanied by an explanation of the cumulative reserve underfunding that produced the need is materially more politically defensible than the same proposal presented without context.

The framework provides that context. Practitioners are encouraged to use it as a communicative tool with the membership, with directors who are new to the board, and with the institutional partners (lenders, insurers, regulators) whose decisions about the association are influenced by the institution's apparent stage.

13. Implications for Industry Standards

The framework has implications for at least four bodies of industry-standard development. This section identifies the implications without prescribing specific standard-setting actions; the appropriate

developers of those actions are CAI, the Foundation for Community Association Research, the Common Interest Community Standards Council, and analogous industry bodies.

13.1 Reserve-Study Standards

The National Reserve Study Standards prescribe methodology for reserve studies but do not require stage-specific adaptation of methodology. The framework suggests that reserve studies for late-Stage 4 and Stage 5 associations may benefit from supplementary analyses — particularly stress-testing of the funding plan against the cumulative effect of any underfunding observed in prior years and explicit treatment of reinvention scenarios where applicable. Standard-setters should consider whether stage-aware reserve-study methodology would advance practitioner practice.²²

13.2 Transition-Practice Standards

Transition is the inflection point at which the framework predicts the largest single intervention effect on long-term association outcomes, but no comprehensive industry-standard practice document for transition exists. The Council and CAI should consider developing such a document, which would typically include independent-professional engagement standards, records-turnover specifications, common-area-acceptance protocols, and insurance and warranty review checklists.

13.3 Governance-Currency Standards

State statutory regimes evolve continuously, and an association that complied with statute in year 10 may, by year 30, be operating under a substantially evolved regime. No current industry-standard practice prescribes periodic governance-document review against statutory currency. The framework suggests that such review — perhaps on a five-year cycle — would meaningfully reduce the cumulative regulatory exposure observed in late-stage associations.

13.4 Volunteer-Engagement Standards

Volunteer engagement is the binding constraint on governance at multiple stages, but no industry-standard practice currently addresses engagement development as a discipline. CAI's existing volunteer-leadership programs are valuable but address volunteer training rather than volunteer-pool development. Standard-setters should consider whether engagement-development methodology — modeled on best practices from broader nonprofit-sector development — would strengthen association governance across the lifecycle.¹⁴

14. Limitations and Future Research

The framework presented here has several limitations that warrant explicit acknowledgment.

First, the framework is constructed through analytical synthesis rather than original empirical investigation. The hypothesis that the five stages identified here describe community-association evolution accurately is testable but has not been tested. A research program testing the framework would, at minimum, examine: (a) whether the indicators identified for each stage do reliably differentiate associations at different points in their developmental history; (b) whether the specific inflection points the framework identifies do produce the operational consequences the framework predicts; (c) whether the practitioner intervention framework derived from the model produces measurably better outcomes than alternative interventions.

Second, the framework is grounded in U.S. statutory and operational practice. Common-interest housing exists in many other jurisdictions, sometimes under similar legal architectures and sometimes under materially different ones. The framework's applicability outside the U.S. is unexamined. Comparative research drawing on community-association practice in Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom, and other common-law jurisdictions would test the generalizability of the model.

Third, the framework treats the five stages as exhaustive, but it does not exclude the possibility of intermediate stages, stage variants associated with specific community-association types (cooperatives, age-restricted communities, mixed-use developments), or geographic-specific stage variants associated with particular state regulatory regimes. Future research may identify such variants and refine the framework accordingly.

Fourth, the framework is silent on the question of association dissolution. While dissolution is statutorily provided for in most jurisdictions and does occur in practice, the conditions under which dissolution is preferable to continued institutional existence are not addressed by the framework. This is a significant omission for the policy literature on common-interest housing and warrants separate treatment.

Fifth, the framework's treatment of reinvention is preliminary. The research literature on organizational reinvention, corporate restructuring, and turnaround management is substantial; its application to community associations specifically has been limited. A separate paper developing the reinvention pathway in detail would advance the practitioner literature.

14.1 Future Research Directions

The framework supports several specific research programs:

- A longitudinal study of associations through the Transition stage (Stage 2), comparing institutional outcomes at years 10, 20, and 30 across associations whose transitions involved different levels of independent professional review.
- A cross-sectional study of late-stage associations (Stage 4 and Stage 5) examining the relationship between reserve-funding adequacy and the institutional indicators the framework treats as determinative.

- A comparative-jurisdictions study of statutory effect on lifecycle dynamics, examining whether associations operating under more prescriptive regulatory regimes (California, Florida) exhibit different stage-specific patterns than associations operating under less prescriptive regimes.
- A practitioner-intervention study testing whether the application of the practitioner framework introduced in Section 12 produces measurably better long-term outcomes than alternative governance practices.

15. Conclusion

This paper has proposed The Five Stages of American Community Association — a developmental framework synthesizing canonical organizational lifecycle theory with the political-economy literature on private residential government, the common-pool-resource governance literature, the civic-engagement framework, and the operative state statutory architecture for community associations in the United States.

The framework's value is threefold. As a theoretical contribution, it integrates strands of the organizational, political-economy, and governance literatures that have been developed largely independently and applies them systematically to a institutional form whose scale and significance warrant theoretical attention. As a diagnostic instrument, it enables practitioners to identify the stage of any specific association and to anticipate the governance pressures characteristic of that stage. As a policy contribution, it identifies the points at which industry-standard development and regulatory design intersect most consequentially with developmental dynamics.

The framework is offered in the spirit of the Common Interest Community Standards Council's working-paper series: as an author-attributed analysis intended to advance discussion rather than as a consensus document. Comments, applications, and critiques are welcomed at the contact addresses noted in the colophon. The author expects the framework to be refined through use, and looks forward to the empirical and comparative research the framework enables.

— end of paper —

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Numbered to match the superscripts in the paper's prose. References are formatted in a hybrid academic/industry style suitable for both scholarly and practitioner audiences.

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Appendix A — Stage Identification Worksheet

This worksheet operationalizes the framework's stage definitions for practitioner use. Mark each indicator yes (Y), no (N), or unknown (U). The pattern of responses suggests the association's current stage.

A.1 Stage Indicators

- Developer holds majority of board seats. (Y → Stage 1)
- Statutory transition deadline has passed. (Y → at least Stage 2)
- First homeowner-controlled board has been seated. (Y → at least Stage 2)
- Independent professional review (counsel, CPA, engineer, reserve-study firm) was completed during transition. (Y → reduces Stage 2 risk)
- Annual-meeting and board-meeting practices are routinized. (Y → at least Stage 3)
- Pioneer cohort has substantially turned over through resale. (Y → at least mid-Stage 3)
- Major capital components are within five years of replacement per the reserve study. (Y → Stage 4)
- Reserve-funding ratio is below 70% of fully-funded balance. (Y → indicates Stage 4 challenge regardless of stage)
- Association is at year 30 or beyond from declaration with significant deferred-maintenance backlog. (Y → likely Stage 4)
- Association is at year 45 or beyond from declaration. (Y → at least Stage 5)
- Major reinvention (governing-document restatement, redevelopment, merger) is on the strategic agenda. (Y → reinvention trajectory of Stage 5)

A.2 Stage Assignment

The pattern of responses, combined with the typical year ranges, supports a stage assignment. The worksheet is intended as a starting point; practitioners may need additional information about specific indicators in borderline cases.

Appendix B — Anonymized Case Vignettes

Three anonymized case vignettes illustrate the framework in operation. Identifying details have been altered to preserve confidentiality; the structural dynamics described are accurate to the underlying matters.

B.1 Westlake Crossing — A Stage 4 Adaptive Change Case

Westlake Crossing is a 412-unit master-planned community in suburban Texas, organized as a property-owners association. Developed in two phases between 1998 and 2004, the developer relinquished control to the homeowner-elected board in 2007 — three years past the statutory deadline, only after the homeowners' association counsel filed a petition compelling transition.

By 2026 (year 28 from declaration), the association exhibits Stage 4 dynamics. An updated reserve study has identified two surprises that the original developer-commissioned study did not: substantial underestimation of asphalt-overlay costs across the community's three private streets, and a perimeter-wall structural-rehabilitation event the original study did not contemplate. The reserve fund is at approximately 28% of the fully-funded balance recommended by the new study, against a current operating budget of \$1.4 million.

The case illustrates the path-dependence of reserve funding (Section 10.1): the underfunding observed in 2026 is the cumulative consequence of decisions made during the 2007-2024 Stabilization period, not the consequence of any single recent decision. The framework's diagnostic value at this stage is its emphasis on the lifecycle context of the current capital pressure.

B.2 Lakeview Commons — A Stage 3 Drift Case

Lakeview Commons is a 264-unit suburban condominium completed in 2014. The developer turned over control on schedule in 2017. The first homeowner board, working with the management company, set monthly assessments at \$310 per unit and continued the developer's reserve-funding plan unchanged.

By 2024 (year 7 from transition; mid-Stage 3), the association exhibits classic drift dynamics. Monthly assessments have drifted up to \$355 to absorb insurance and utility increases; reserve contribution has remained at \$108,000 per year against a study-recommended figure of \$230,000 per year. Aged accounts receivable, which had been 2.4% of annual budget at transition, has climbed steadily through the period to 8.4% at the end of 2024. The 2024 audit produced two findings: an unrecorded \$42,000 vendor liability and a non-functional bank-reconciliation control.

The case illustrates the drift pattern characteristic of mid-Stage 3 (Section 7.5): no single decision is catastrophic, but the cumulative effect over five to seven years materially weakens the institution. The framework's diagnostic value is its emphasis on cross-time comparison; an indicator-by-indicator review

at any single point in this period would have shown an association within tolerable bands, while a multi-year trend review surfaces the pattern.

B.3 Brooks Tower — A Stage 4 Capital-Decision Case

Brooks Tower is a 184-unit oceanfront condominium on the South Texas coast, completed in 1996. By 2026 (year 30 from declaration; transitioning between Stage 3 and Stage 4), the association faces an acute insurance-renewal pressure. The incumbent property carrier has non-renewed citing carrier withdrawal from coastal Texas after recent hurricane losses. Three replacement quotes return at average premiums 78% above the expiring program plus a wind/hail deductible of 5% of total insured value (versus the expiring 2%).

The case illustrates the interaction between the lifecycle framework and the regulatory-environment evolution discussed in Section 10.3. The association's Stage 4 capital-decision dynamics are compounded by an insurance market hardening that has been a multi-year reality for Texas Gulf Coast associations. The framework's value at this inflection is in articulating the lifecycle context: a board facing this insurance-market reality benefits from understanding that the underlying physical-asset condition (which determines what carriers will write) is a Stage 4 question, even though the immediate decision is an insurance-renewal question.

Appendix C — Glossary of Terms

Terms defined here as used in the present paper. Definitions are functional and adapted to the framework's purposes; legal definitions in operative jurisdictions may differ.

- Adaptive Change — the fourth lifecycle stage, typically years 30-45, characterized by capital-decision pressure as long-lived components reach end of useful life.
- Civic engagement — pattern of voluntary participation in association governance (meeting attendance, committee service, electoral participation, informal communication).
- Common-pool resource — institutional form characterized by shared resource subject to collective-governance rules, as developed by Ostrom (1990).
- Declarant — the developer or successor party that recorded the original Declaration creating the association; controls the first lifecycle stage.
- Drift — the cumulative effect of small departures from established practice that, over a multi-year period, materially weakens institutional capacity.
- Inflection point — a transition between lifecycle stages, typically triggered by a statutory deadline, demographic shift, or capital-decision threshold.
- Maturity & Reiteration — the fifth lifecycle stage, typically year 45 and beyond, characterized by either steady-state institutional persistence or strategic reinvention.
- Pioneer — practitioner term for the first generation of homeowners taking title in an association during the Declarant period.
- Reinvention — strategic reset of the lifecycle through governing-document restatement, major redevelopment, merger, or conversion.
- Reserve fund — long-term account for replacement and major repair of common-area capital components.
- Stabilization — the third lifecycle stage, typically years 15-30, characterized by routinization of governance practice and consolidation of institutional culture.
- Transition — the second lifecycle stage and its embedded statutory event, during which control passes from the developer to a homeowner-elected board.